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Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness1 
Justin Sytsma 
 
Abstract: In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have 
mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. 
As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the 
mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In 
particular, it is not known whether the folk even tend to classify mental states in terms of their 
being or not being phenomenally conscious in the first place. Things have changed 
dramatically in the last few years, however, with a flurry of ground-breaking research by 
psychologists and experimental philosophers. In this article I will review this work, carefully 
distinguishing between two questions: First, are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard 
to the mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious related to their 
decisions about whether morally right or wrong action has been done to an entity? Second, do 
the folk tend to classify mental states in the way that philosophers do, distinguishing between 




 Over the course of the last several decades a great deal of progress has been made on 
the question of how people understand a variety of psychological phenomena. This work on 
folk theory of mind, or folk psychology, is typically involved in explaining how we are able to 
predict agentive behavior by ascribing and reasoning about mental states like beliefs and 
desires. In particular, folk psychology is thought to be involved in our judgments that certain 
objects are agents and our interpretation of their movements as intentional actions (Malle; 
Gopnik and Meltzoff; Wellman; Perner). 
There is also a range of mental states, however, that have been extremely important in 
the philosophical discussions of the mind since at least the time of Descartes, but that have 
attracted little attention from psychologists working on folk psychology. These are states such 
as feeling pain, seeing red, hearing a C#—in brief the states that are thought to be 
phenomenally conscious, in philosophers' jargon. While researchers have had relatively little 
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to say with regard to folk psychological judgments about these mental states, this has changed 
in recent years with a spate of exciting new work being done by experimental philosophers 
and psychologists (Gray, Gray, and Wegner; Knobe and Prinz; Sytsma and Machery ‘How to 
Study’, ‘Two Conceptions’; Sytsma ‘Dennett’s Theory’; Arico; Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and 
Nichols; Huebner; Huebner, Bruno, and Sarkissian).  
Following Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz, much of this literature has focused on the 
question of whether the folk have, perhaps implicitly, something like the philosophical 
concept of phenomenal consciousness. I (now) think that this is unfortunate for several 
reasons. First, to answer this question requires having a clear understanding of the 
philosophical concept, but philosophers are not always clear on the point and it is arguable 
that there are in fact many different concepts at play. Second, an adequate answer to this 
question requires a metric for comparing the similarity of concepts, which might depend on 
the theory of concepts that one endorses. Finally, the literature most clearly deals with a prior 
question that can be answered without giving a full articulation of the philosophical concept 
of phenomenal consciousness or how a folk concept might be similar to it. The prior question 
is whether or not the folk classify mental states as philosophers do: Do the folk treat mental 
states as dividing into two basic kinds (those that philosophers take to be phenomenally 
conscious and those that they do not), tending to treat mental states of each kind similarly? 
Focusing on the question of how the folk classify the mental states that philosophers 
take to be phenomenally conscious, we do not need to give a full account of the concept of 
phenomenal consciousness. Rather, it will suffice to note which mental states philosophers 
classify as being phenomenally conscious. Philosophers of mind typically hold that there is 
“something it is like” (Nagel) to be in a diverse range of mental states. These mental states are 
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thought to be phenomenally conscious in virtue of having distinctive phenomenal qualities 
and uncontroversial examples include perceptual states (seeing red, hearing a C#) and bodily 
sensations (feeling pain, nausea); further, felt emotions and felt moods (happiness, depression) 
are often added to this list (Levin; Tye). Phenomenally conscious mental states are generally 
contrasted with states like beliefs and desires that are thought to be non-phenomenal. 
 In this article, I will examine recent empirical research on how ordinary people 
understand the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious.2 In 
particular, I will consider two questions: Are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard to 
phenomenally conscious mental states involved in their judgments about whether an action is 
morally right or wrong? And, do the folk classify mental states as philosophers do, treating 
them as dividing into two basic kinds—mental states that are phenomenally conscious and 
mental states that are not phenomenally conscious?  
 I will survey recent work on these two questions, respectively, in Sections 1 and 2. 
Overall, this research suggests an affirmative answer to the first question, at least for some of 
the relevant mental states, but a tentative negative answer to the second question. Specifically, 
work by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery (‘Two Conceptions’) indicates that the folk do 
not tend to classify mental states as philosophers do. They go on to suggest that the 
fundamental division for the folk instead centers on whether or not a mental state is thought to 
have a valence. This valence hypothesis is explored in Section 3, and I suggest that it is 
compatible with the research linking the folk classification of mental states to moral 
cognition. Finally, in Section 4, I consider further directions that research on the folk 
understanding of mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious is taking. 
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1. Phenomenal Consciousness and Moral Patiency 
Heather Gray, Kurt Gray, and Daniel Wegner present evidence that people distinguish 
between two broad aspects of having a mind. They gave participants 78 pair-wise 
comparisons of 13 characters (including a 7-week-old fetus, adult man, frog, a dead woman, 
and the robot Kismet) for one of 24 mental capacities and personal judgments. For example, 
one comparison solicited the participants’ judgments about whether a 5-year-old girl is more 
or less likely to be able to feel pain than a wild chimpanzee. Gray et al. found a clear divide 
between those capacities that they grouped under what they termed the “Experience 
dimension” (including hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, rage) and those grouped under the 
“Agency dimension” (including self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition). The 
possession of the different Experience capacities were correlated with each other across 
agents, as were the different Agency capacities, while the possession of these mental 
capacities were poorly correlated across the two groupings. Thus, while a 5-month-old human 
infant scored low on Agency and high on Experience, God scored high on Agency and low on 
Experience. (See Arico et al., however, for an empirically supported argument that agency 
cues are nonetheless used in making judgments about experiential mental states.) 
 Gray et al. also found that moral judgments about the characters related to their two 
dimensions of mind perception. Specifically, they found that Agency is tied to moral agency 
(whether or not an entity is capable of morally right or wrong action), while Experience is tied 
to moral patiency (whether or not an entity can have morally right or wrong action done to it). 
Their participants held that some agents are open to moral blame, but not moral harm, while 
other agents are open to moral harm, but not moral blame.  
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 Gray et al.’s results indicate that the folk treat a range of experiential states as being 
similar—tending to ascribe them to the same entities—and that the ascription of such states 
correlate with their judgments about moral patiency. But, how should we understand Gray et 
al.’s Experience dimension? The choice of terminology is suggestive of the philosophical 
concept of phenomenal consciousness, which is often discussed in terms of conscious 
experience (or just experience for short). Nonetheless, Gray et al.’s Experience dimension 
only includes examples of some of the types of mental states that philosophers take to be 
phenomenally conscious. Thus, it does not include any examples of perceptual states (does 
not include seeing red or hearing a C#, for example). As such, this study does not tell us 
whether the folk tend to classify mental states as philosophers do, nor does it tell us whether 
folk ascriptions of mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious are 
correlated with their judgments about moral patiency (as opposed to some subset of those 
states). 
 As discussed in the following section, Knobe and Prinz present empirical evidence 
suggesting that the folk do in fact classify mental states as philosophers do. They take this to 
show that the folk have the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness. Knobe and 
Prinz then use this evidence to argue that folk psychology is not solely geared toward the 
explanation and prediction of behavior. They hold that whether or not ascriptions of 
phenomenally conscious mental states might facilitate behavioral explanation or prediction, 
they play a clear role in people’s moral judgments. They tested this in their fifth of five 
studies. In this study, participants were asked to give a free-response answer indicating why 
they think that a person who has a job working with fish might be interested in ascribing 
either memory or feeling to the fish. The answers were then independently coded as calling on 
 6
either “prediction, explanation or control” or “moral judgments.” Knobe and Prinz found that 
100% of the responses for memory called on the former (while only 9% called on moral 
judgment); in contrast, all of the responses for feeling called on moral judgment (while none 
called on prediction, explanation or control). They conclude that “it seems that ascriptions of 
phenomenal consciousness are best understood in terms of their role in facilitating moral 
judgment” (82).  
 
2. Classifying Phenomenally Conscious Mental States 
Despite the links drawn between moral cognition and ascriptions of phenomenally conscious 
mental states by Knobe and Prinz, it is important to reiterate that there are two distinct 
questions to be asked: First, are judgments about (at least some of) the mental states that 
philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious involved in ascriptions of moral patiency? 
Second, do the folk classify mental states as philosophers do? While the above work indicates 
that folk judgments about some of the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally 
conscious are involved in moral cognition, the evidence is less clear with regard to the 
question of whether the folk classify mental states in a way that corresponds with the 
philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness. 
 In addition to giving a positive answer to the first question, Knobe and Prinz also gave 
a positive answer to the second question. Most importantly, in the second of their five studies, 
they asked participants to indicate how natural sounding a range of ten sentences ascribing 
mental states to a group agent (Acme Corporation) were. They found that participants rated 
the five sentences that ascribed mental states that philosophers typically take to be 
phenomenally conscious as less natural sounding than the five sentences that ascribed mental 
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states that philosophers do not typically take to be phenomenally conscious.3 The results are 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Results, Knobe and Prinz Study 2. 
 
Knobe and Prinz interpret this body of evidence as showing that (i) the folk distinguish 
between phenomenally conscious mental states and mental states that are not phenomenally 
conscious and (ii) that in contrast to the latter mental states, the ascription of phenomenally 
conscious mental states does not merely depend on the functional properties of the ascribee’s 
states. 
 This conclusion has attracted the attention of critics, however (Arico; Sytsma and 
Machery ‘How to Study’). Notably, Sytsma and Machery target the conclusion that the folk 
                                                 
3 The five non-phenomenal sentences are: Acme Corp. believes that its profit margin will soon increase; Acme 
Corp. intends to release a new product this January; Acme Corp. wants to change its corporate image; Acme 
Corp. knows that it can never compete with GenCorp in the pharmaceuticals market; Acme Corp. has just 
decided to adopt a new marketing plan. The five phenomenal sentences are: Acme Corp. is now experiencing 
great joy; Acme Corp. is getting depressed; Acme Corp. is feeling excruciating pain; Acme Corp. is experiencing 
a sudden urge to pursue internet advertising; Acme Corp. is now vividly imagining a purple square. 
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specifically distinguish between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental 
states that are not phenomenally conscious. They contend that there is a natural alternative to 
Knobe and Prinz’s explanation of their data, noting that corporations and individual humans 
differ in some significant behavioral and functional ways. Unlike an individual, Acme 
Corporation is distributed; while it is comprised, in part, of individual human bodies, it does 
not have its own body with which to bodily express joy or disgust, for example. As such, 
when people deny that Acme Corporation can experience great joy, it is unclear whether they 
focus on the supposed phenomenality of this state as opposed to the striking functional and 
behavioral differences between corporations and humans. For this reason, Sytsma and 
Machery charge that Knobe and Prinz’s empirical work is ultimately inconclusive about 
whether or not the folk have the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness. 
 In fact, in a subsequent article Sytsma and Machery (‘Two Conceptions’) found that 
the folk do not classify mental states as philosophers do. They began by noting that 
phenomenal consciousness is a technical term in philosophy of mind. As discussed in the 
introduction, the definitions of the key terms in this area are often contentious, but the 
standard line is that there is something it is like to be in phenomenally conscious mental 
states. Sytsma and Machery show that these states are standardly said to have phenomenal 
qualities, or qualia, in virtue of which they are phenomenally conscious. For example, Peter 
Caruthers notes that “many philosophers use the term ‘qualia’ liberally, to refer to those 
properties of mental states (whatever they may be) in virtue of which the states in question are 
phenomenally conscious” (15). Sytsma and Machery then illustrate that uncontroversial 
examples of phenomenally conscious mental states include perceptual states (such as seeing 
red) and bodily sensations (such as feeling pain). 
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 Sytsma and Machery argue that if the folk have the philosophical concept of 
phenomenal consciousness, then they should tend to classify mental states as philosophers do, 
treating paradigmatic examples of phenomenally conscious mental states similarly. 
Specifically, both philosophers and non-philosophers should deny that an entity that is 
presumably too simple to be phenomenally conscious can either see red or feel pain. Sytsma 
and Machery reasoned that if it is correct that the folk classify mental states as philosophers 
do, then we would expect both groups to treat perceptual states like seeing red analogously to 
bodily sensations like feeling pain, tending to deny both to a simple non-humanoid robot. The 
first of their three studies tested this hypothesis. This online study was open to both 
philosophers and non-philosophers, with participants being given a description of an agent 
(either an undergraduate student or a simple robot) performing behaviorally analogous tasks 
that were designed to elicit judgments that the undergraduate had undergone a phenomenally 
conscious mental state. In each of the scenarios either the undergraduate or the robot was 
instructed to manipulate one of three boxes distinguished by color. In two of the four 
scenarios, that manipulation was successful and the participants were asked whether the agent 
“saw red,” answering on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “clearly no,” at 4 with “not sure,” 
and at 7 with “clearly yes.” In the other two scenarios, the agent was electrically shocked and 
participants were asked whether the agent “felt pain,” answering on the same scale.  
 Dividing the participants into two groups on the basis of their philosophical training, 
Sytsma and Machery found that the responses of philosophers were consistent with the 
hypothesis, while the responses of non-philosophers were not. They found that the 
philosophers surveyed treated the perceptual experience and the bodily sensation analogously, 
refusing to ascribe either state to the robot and ascribing both states to the undergraduate. In 
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sharp contrast to philosophers, however, non-philosophers did not treat these states 
analogously: While non-philosophers were willing to ascribe both the perceptual state of 
seeing red and the bodily sensation of feeling pain to the undergraduate, they diverged from 
philosophers in ascribing seeing red to the robot. Like philosophers, the non-philosophers 
surveyed were not willing to ascribe feeling pain to the robot. The results are shown 
graphically in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Results, Sytsma and Machery (‘Two Conceptions’) Study 1. 
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In contrast to the prediction derived from Knobe and Prinz’s claim that the folk have the 
philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness, Sytsma and Machery’s results suggest 
that there is a divergence between how philosophers and the folk classify mental states. On 
average, the folk (but not philosophers) were willing to ascribe the perceptual state of seeing 
red to a simple robot. As such, their results offer some preliminary evidence that in contrast to 
philosophers, the folk do not tend to treat the mental states tested as being of the same type, 
i.e. as both being phenomenally conscious. 
 Sytsma and Machery discuss a number of objections that have been raised against the 
conclusion they draw from their first study. Most prominently, it has been argued that non-
philosophers do take mental states like seeing red and feeling pain to be phenomenally 
conscious, but that they simply do not make use of those judgments in this study. Specifically, 
it has been suggested that non-philosophers distinguish between two senses of the term 
“see”—one that only requires that the agent make the relevant discriminations between 
perceptual stimuli and one that requires that the agent be in the relevant phenomenally 
conscious mental state; the critic then argues that the non-philosophers in Sytsma and 
Machery’s study read the test question in the first sense when they affirmed that the robot 
“sees red.” This argument was suggested by Bryce Huebner and forcefully put forward by 
Eric Schwitzgebel in his commentary on Sytsma and Machery’s paper at the 2008 Society for 
Philosophy and Psychology meeting.  
Sytsma (‘Dennett’s Theory’) has responded to this objection further, presenting 
evidence that the folk by and large hold a naïve view of colors, treating the colors that we are 
acquainted with in ordinary perception as mind-independent qualities of external objects. This 
view of colors is not straightforwardly compatible with dividing “seeing” into the two senses 
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suggested above: The relevant discriminations are with regard to the colors that we are 
acquainted with and these colors are not taken to be mental. More surprisingly, Sytsma 
presents evidence suggesting that the folk also by and large hold a naïve view of pains. 
Accepting for the sake of discussion that the folk do not classify mental states as 
philosophers do, how do they classify mental states? Sytsma and Machery investigate this 
question in two follow-up studies. Their results suggest that the folk classify mental states in 
terms of whether or not they are thought to have a valence. 
 
3. Folk Ascriptions and Valence 
Sytsma and Machery’s second and third studies used the same methodology as their first—
comparing a simple robot to a normal human—to explore the responses of non-philosophers 
for the mental states of feeling anger and smelling a range of olfactory stimuli. In their second 
study they found that while participants treated feeling anger analogously to feeling pain 
(denying both of the robot), they were split on the attribution of smelling banana to the robot 
(the mean response was not significantly different from a neutral response). Sytsma and 
Machery hypothesized that the folk’s willingness to ascribe mental states to a simple robot 
was sensitive to whether or not they associated a valence with that state; that is, whether or 
not they thought it was essential to being in the state is that it be either liked or disliked, or 
have an “hedonic value” (Robbins and Jack). This hypothesis is nicely congruent with recent 
work by Nick Haslam and colleagues showing that people in Australia, China, and Italy found 
that in comparison to humans, robots “are most deficient in emotion and desire” (254). 
 In contrast to externally directed states like seeing a red box that are plausibly thought 
to lack valence, internally directed states like feeling pain are plausibly thought to critically 
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involve a negative valence. States like smelling banana, however, both involve perceptual 
discriminations of external stimuli and are plausibly thought to involve a positive valence that 
is not critical to the perceptual discriminations. Sytsma and Machery hypothesized that the 
folk were divided in their judgments about whether the robot smelled banana because while 
they hold that the robot is capable of perceiving the scent of banana, they also hold that it is 
incapable of liking that scent. They then predicted that the folk would be willing to ascribe 
olfactory perceptual states to the robot that they did not associate with either a positive or a 
negative valence.  
Sytsma and Machery’s third study tested this prediction by comparing participants’ 
responses for three olfactory stimuli—a familiar stimulus that participants were likely to think 
is pleasant to smell (banana), a familiar stimulus that participants were likely to think is 
unpleasant to smell (vomit), and a stimulus that participants were unlikely to be familiar with 
and therefore unlikely to think of as either pleasant or unpleasant to smell (isoamyl acetate). 
They found that while the mean responses for banana and vomit were not significantly 
different from the neutral response, participants readily ascribed the state of smelling isoamyl 
acetate to the robot. 
One potential objection to Sytsma and Machery’s third study is that the folk did not 
treat the olfactory perceptual states differently because they made different judgments about 
whether these states had a valence, but treated them differently because one of the stimuli was 
thought to be more relevant to the robot’s interests. Thus, it might be that participants were 
more likely to say that the robot smelled isoamyl acetate than banana because detecting 
chemicals is more relevant to the robot’s interests than detecting pieces of fruit.4 If this 
hypothesis is correct, then Sytsma and Machery’s third study does not provide evidence in 
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favor of the valence hypothesis, suggesting that an alternative explanation might be needed of 
why the folk treat perceptual states like seeing red differently from bodily sensations like 
feeling pain (both of which are plausibly relevant to the robot’s interests). 
Nonetheless, setting this objection aside for the sake of discussion, Sytsma and 
Machery argue that rather than classify mental states in terms of whether or not they are 
thought to be phenomenally conscious, the folk instead classify them in terms of whether or 
not they thought it was essential to being in the state that it have a valence. While this 
conclusion might seem to contradict the studies reviewed in Section 1, it is in fact quite 
compatible with the finding that folk ascriptions of some mental states are relevant to their 
moral cognition. In effect, Sytsma and Machery reinterpret Gray et al.’s results, noting that 
their Experience dimension does not include examples of one of the most paradigmatic types 
of phenomenally conscious mental states: It includes no perceptual experiences such as seeing 
red or smelling banana. It is therefore possible that judgments of moral patiency are most 
directly linked to judgments that an agent is capable of having mental states that are thought 
to have a valence and not specifically to the agent being capable of having phenomenally 
conscious mental states. Thus, the fifth study conducted by Knobe and Prinz compares 
remembering with feeling. While remembering where to find food in a lake is not clearly 
suggestive of valence, this is not the case for feeling. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that in 
asking why a fisherman might want to know about whether fish are capable of feeling, there is 
an implication that the state of interest is pain (which is clearly associated with valence). 
 Sytsma and Machery conclude that if their hypothesis is correct, then it potentially has 
significant philosophical implications. Most notably, their findings cast doubt on a common 
justification given for the reality of the “hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers, The 
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Conscious Mind). While philosophers like David Chalmers often justify the claim that there is 
a real problem, here, by arguing that phenomenal consciousness is undeniable because it is 
“the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives” (‘Facing Up’ 207), Sytsma and 
Machery’s results suggest that phenomenal consciousness might not be so central and 
manifest. If their account of how the folk classify mental states is correct, then this suggests 
that the folk do not find it to be obvious that mental states like seeing red and feeling pain 
have something central in common (namely that they are phenomenally conscious), despite 
their first-person experience with such mental states.  
An obvious response to Sytsma and Machery’s argument is that just because the folk 
do not classify mental states as philosophers do, this does not imply that a hard problem does 
not arise with regard to some of the mental states that philosophers take to be phenomenally 
conscious. In particular, it might be argued that a new hard problem emerges for those states 
that people are unwilling to ascribe to the simple robot—that is, mental states that they think 
have a valence.  
The core of the hard problem of consciousness is that certain mental states seem to 
resist functional explanation. As David Chalmers expresses the point (‘Facing Up’ 203): 
“Even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions 
in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, 
verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance 
of these functions accompanied by experience?” This core of the hard problem could be 
maintained while restricting the range of “experiences” that are thought to pose a problem. 
Thus, it might be argued that mental states that have a valence are not fully open to functional 
or neuroscientific explanation and that this is indicated by the folk’s unwillingness to ascribe 
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these mental states to the robot. If the folk conception of mental states with valence is such 
that even after the relevant performances have been explained there seems to remain an 
outstanding question of why those performances are accompanied by valence, then 
Chalmers’s argument could be re-run. Currently, however, it is not clear that the folk do (or 
should) conceive of valence in a way that resists functional explanation or that might generate 
a hard problem of valence. 
Sytsma (‘Phenomenological Obviousness’) argues that Sytsma and Machery’s results 
have a related implication for some scientific work, putting pressure on scientists interested in 
explaining phenomenal consciousness. The argument is that the existence of phenomenal 
consciousness is often taken to be obvious to a subject just in undergoing the relevant mental 
states. But, it is not clear that phenomenal consciousness is obvsious to the folk despite their 
undergoing states like seeing red and feeling pain. As such, Sytsma argues that these 
researchers owe us an alternative justification for their claims that the supposed scientific 
phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness actually exists.  
Whether or not Sytsma and Machery’s theory of how the folk classify mental states is 
correct, and whether or not it has significant philosophical and scientific implications if it is, 
are questions that continue to be pursued. 
 
4. Further Directions 
The research reviewed above has made significant progress toward understanding how the 
folk classify mental states and the role of these classifications in judgments about moral 
patiency. This work suggests that while folk ascriptions of some mental states that 
philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious are involved in the judgments that the folk 
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make about moral patiency, the way that they classify mental states might not coincide closely 
with the philosophical distinction between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and 
mental states that are not phenomenally conscious. Nonetheless, there is still much more work 
to be done in this area. In this section I discuss a few further directions that this work is 
taking. 
 As we saw above, Sytsma and Machery (‘Two Conceptions’) present preliminary 
evidence that how the folk classify mental states is linked to judgments about valence. 
Currently, however, their findings only relate to a small sub-set of those states that 
philosophers take to be phenomenally conscious and only involve comparisons to one type of 
non-human agent (a simple robot). Further, there are potential objections to the studies 
supporting their theory. Additional research is under way to replicate and extend these results, 
investigating whether they generalize to other mental states and to a wider range of agents. 
It is also important to investigate what cues drive folk ascriptions of the mental states 
that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious. Work on this topic has been pioneered 
by Bryce Huebner and by Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert Goldberg, and Shaun Nichols. 
Huebner has conducted two experiments comparing ascriptions of belief, pain, and happiness 
to four agents: a normal human, a cyborg with a human brain but a robot body, a cyborg with 
a human body but a robot brain, and a robot. Across the experiments he found that there was 
no significant difference in the participants’ willingness to ascribe beliefs to each of the four 
agents. In contrast, Huebner found that they were significantly less likely to ascribe feeling 
pain to the two agents with robotic bodies than to the two with human bodies. For the case of 
happiness, however, participants were significantly more likely to ascribe the emotion to the 
human than to any of the other three agents. This suggests that information about both type of 
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body and type of brain are important to folk ascriptions of some mental states (feeling 
happiness), that information about type of body is most important to ascriptions of some 
mental states (feeling pain), and that neither is especially important to ascriptions of some 
mental states (belief). Further, based on these results, Huebner argues that judgments about 
emotions play a central role in determining what degree of moral concern an agent deserves. 
 Arico et al. have investigated the role of simple agency cues (facial features, motion 
trajectories, contingent interaction) in ascriptions of different mental states. They ran a 
reaction time study in which participants performed a property-attribution task. They were 
presented with a sequence of object/attribution pairs and asked to indicate whether the object 
was capable of having the attribute. The attributes of interest involved three mental states that 
are typically associated with valence—feeling anger, feeling happy, and feeling pain. Objects 
were drawn from categories including insects, plants, vehicles, and natural moving objects 
(such as clouds). Arico et al. found that participants were significantly more likely to ascribe 
the three mental states noted above to insects than to any of the items lacking simple agency 
cues. Further, in denying that insects were capable of having these mental states, participants 
were significantly slower than when denying those states to vehicles or natural moving 
objects. Interestingly, the same pattern held for plants, with participants showing no 
significant difference in reaction times between plants and insects. Arico et al. suggest that 
this might indicate the importance of judgments that an entity is living for ascriptions of 






In investigating folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have primarily 
investigated how people understand mental states like beliefs and desires that philosophers 
typically classify as non-phenomenal. This has changed in recent years with a number of 
intriguing studies looking at the folk understanding of phenomenally consciousness mental 
states being performed by experimental philosophers and psychologists. I have surveyed this 
literature, focusing on two questions: (1) Are folk ascriptions of mental states that 
philosophers take to be phenomenal related to folk judgments about moral patiency? (2) Do 
the folk classify mental states as philosophers do, treating them as dividing into two basic 
kinds (phenomenal and non-phenomenal mental states)? The current evidence suggests a 
restricted positive answer to the first question and a tentative negative answer to the second 
question. The empirical studies surveyed indicate that folk ascriptions of at least some of the 
mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious are related to their 
judgments about moral patiency and tentatively suggest that the folk do not classify mental 
states as philosophers do, tending to treat some paradigmatic examples of phenomenally 
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